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Millian Superiorities and the
Repugnant Conclusion
KARSTEN KL INT JENSEN
University of Copenhagen, Denmark
James Griffin has considered a form of superiority in value that is weaker than lexical
priority as a possible remedy to the Repugnant Conclusion. In this article, I demonstrate
that, in a context where value is additive, this weaker form collapses into the stronger
form of superiority. And in a context where value is non-additive, weak superiority does
not amount to a radical value difference at all. These results are applied on one of Larry
Temkin’s cases against transitivity. I demonstrate that Temkin appeals to two conflicting
notions of aggregation. I then spell out the consequences of these results for different
interpretations of Griffin’s suggestion regarding population ethics. None of them comes
out very successful, but perhaps they nevertheless retain some interest.
INTRODUCTION
John Stuart Mill famously introduced the notion of superiority of
quality of a pleasure, claiming that1
[i]f one of the two [pleasures] is, by those who are competently acquainted with
both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing
it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it
for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are
justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far
outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.
In recent decades, such superiority relations between different objects
of value have been the subject of interest, probably because James
Griffin, Derek Parfit and others have considered them a possible
remedy to the Repugnant Conclusion in population ethics.
Parfit states different versions of the Repugnant Conclusion,2 but
what they seem to have in common is this: suppose we have a scale
of welfare. Consider some number of people n all living on a very high
level a. For any positive level of welfare, z, however low, a population
of m people at z is better than n people at a, provided m is large
enough. Parfit and many others consider this conclusion repugnant.
It follows straightforwardly from the Utilitarian Total Principle (if
mz>na and hence ifm>na/z). But according to Parfit, it follows from
1 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, 1861, quoted from Utilitarianism, On Liberty,
Considerations on Representative Government (London, 1993), p. 9.
2 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, 1984), pp. 338, 419–41.
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any reasonable principle of beneficence,3 provided that mere addition
of people at a positive level of welfare does not make an outcome worse
and that the principle ‘if y is not worse than x and z is better then y,
then z is better than x’ holds for betterness.
In a note, Griffin writes:4
[. . .] That our reasoning carries us to New Z is The Repugnant Conclusion.
But does it? [. . .] there is another possibility confined entirely to the reasoning
about beneficence. Parfit’s argument seems implicitly to employ a totting-
up conception of measuring well-being; it treats well-being as measurable
on a single continuous additive scale, where low numbers, if added to
themselves often enough, must become larger than any initial, larger number.
But this seems not true in prudential cases, and it would seem likely
that this incommensurability in prudential values would get transferred to
interpersonal calculation. Perhaps it is better to have a certain number of
people at a certain high level than a very much larger number at a level where
life is just worth living. Then we might wish to stop the slide [. . .] at that point
along the line where people’s capacity to appreciate beauty, to form deep loving
relationships, to accomplish something with their lives beyond just staying
alive . . .all disappear.
Griffin points to an implicit assumption as to the measurement of
welfare. He claims that Parfit’s arguments to the effect that we cannot
avoid the Repugnant Conclusion implicitly assume welfare to be mea-
surable on a continuous additive scale satisfying what is known as the
Archimedean property of real numbers: for any positive number x, no
matter how small, and for any number y, no matter how large, there ex-
ists an integer n, such that nx≥ y. This simplymeans that any two (pos-
itive) levels of welfare are commensurable, i.e. their ratio is not infinite.
But reflection on the measurement of welfare suggests that this
assumption is not fulfilled. Presumably, then, a certain low level z could
be infinitely small compared with other, higher levels, for instance a.
And it would seem to follow that this level could never add up to the
high level, that is, the total na would necessarily be greater than the
total mz, no matter how large m is. Therefore, the Utilitarian Total
Principle does not imply the Repugnant Conclusion. At least this is
how I shall understand Griffin’s suggestion.
Somewhat strangely, no one appears to have taken this suggestion
seriously. Roger Crisp is an exception.5 He explicitly draws out the
3 A ‘reasonable’ principle of distribution, in this context, is a principle which implies
that if one of two outcomes with the same people has a greater total of welfare and it has
welfare more equally distributed, then it is better.
4 James Griffin,Well-Being: ItsMeaning,Measurement andMoral Importance (Oxford,
1986), p. 340 (n. 27).
5 Roger Crisp, ‘Ideal Utilitarianism: Theory and Practice’ (DPhil. Thesis, Oxford
University, 1988), pp. 177–8.
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consequence that some form of discontinuity will block that the
Repugnant Conclusion follows from Total Utilitarianism. However,
he also identifies this position as a version of Parfit’s Lexical View.6
This seems to me a confusion of two clearly distinct positions. As I
understand the Lexical View, there is a standard (Archimedean) scale of
welfare; but on this scale we then determine two levels, such that lives
above the higher level are assigned a weight which lexically dominates
the weight of lives below the lower level.
The trouble with this view is that it requires some justification to
claim that the welfare of some persons should weigh differently from
that of others. It can hardly be said to be a concern for beneficence to
assign less weight to low levels. And the weights have nothing to do
with considerations of equality: in the outcomes in question, there is
complete equality. It is precisely because it avoids this problem that
Griffin’s suggestion deserves attention.
Griffin introduces two superiority relations that could account for
welfare not being measurable on a scale fulfilling the Archimedean
property. One is trumping: ‘any amount of A outranks any amount of
B’ and the other is the weaker discontinuity: ‘enough of A outranks any
amount of B’.7 He considers the latter more plausible and therefore his
argument is based on discontinuity.
In this article, I shall present some general results on the properties
of this value superiority relation between objects. As we shall see, it
behaves very differently, depending on whether value is additive or
not. In an additive context, discontinuity collapses into trumping. And
in a non-additive context, discontinuity – perhaps counter intuitively –
does not imply a radical value difference at all. I illustrate these results
on a case of Larry Temkin’s against transitivity. I then go on to spell
out the consequences of these results for different interpretations of
Griffin’s suggestion regarding population ethics.
SUPERIORITY IN VALUE WHEN VALUE IS ADDITIVE
This section and the next build on and complement a paper by
Arrhenius and Rabinowicz.8 The framework is this: suppose there
is a countable set of objects. I assume that there is a concatenation
procedure by which it is possible to form a new object by conjoining
a finite number of separate objects into one whole. This includes the
possibility of conjoining an object e a finite number of times m with
6 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 188.
7 Griffin, Well-Being, pp. 83–6.
8 Gustaf Arrhenius and Wlodek Rabinowicz, ‘Millian Superiorities’,Utilitas 17 (2005),
pp. 127–46.
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an object exactly like itself; such an object is designated by ‘me’. The
domain is closed under concatenation.9
On the domain of objects, there is a weak betterness relation, – is
at least as good as –. Strict betterness and equivalence relations are
defined in the usual way.10 This weak betterness relation is assumed to
be transitive11 and complete.12 It is further assumed that concatenation
is value-increasing, i.e. for all objects e and e′, the whole consisting of
e and e′ is better than e. In particular, ‘self-concatenation’ is value-
increasing, i.e. for all objects e and all m>1, me is better than
(m−1)e. Now, we can define the relevant superiority relations
corresponding to Griffin’s trumping and discontinuity (I shall use
Arrhenius’s and Rabinowicz’s terminology from now on):
Definition 1: An object e is superior to an object e′ if and only if, for
all positive integers n, e is better than ne′.
Definition 2: An object e is weakly superior to an object e′ if and only
if, for some positive integer m and all positive integers n, me is better
than ne′.
First, I shall assume that value is additivewith respect to concatenation,
i.e. the value of a concatenated whole is the sum of the value of each
of its constituents. For this, the following condition is the principal
necessary condition:13
Independence: An object e is at least as good as e′, if and only if e
concatenated with any object is at least as good as e′ concatenated with
that object.14
Hence, replacing e′ by e in any whole results in a whole that is at least
as good.
Consider the Archimedean Condition that for all e, e′ there exists a
positive integer n such that ne′ is at least as good as e. This condition
9 It is assumed that concatenation is associative, which means that we get the same
whole from concatenating any three objects, regardless of the order in which they are
concatenated.
10 That is: e is better than e′, if and only if e is at least as good as e′, and e′ is not as
least as good as e; and e is equivalent to e′ if and only if e is at least as good as e′, and e′
is at least as good as e.
11 That is: for all objects e, e′, e′ ′: if e is at least as good as e′, and e′ is at least as good
as e′ ′, then e is at least as good as e′ ′.
12 That is: for all objects e, e′, either e is at least as good as e′ or e′ is at least as good
as e.
13 Cf. David H. Krantz., R. Duncan Luce, Patrick Suppes and Amos Tversky,
Foundations of Measurement, vol. 1: Additive and Polynomial Representations (San
Diego, 1971), pp. 73–4.
14 Arrhenius and Rabinowicz only assume the ‘only if’ − part in their Independence-
condition – that is all they need for their Observation 2.
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is called Archimedean because it corresponds to the Archimedean
property of real numbers. Since the Archimedean property is true
of the real numbers, the Archimedean Condition is necessary for
measurement in real numbers. If the Archimedean condition holds and
the domain is sufficiently rich to ensure the solvability condition that
if e is better than e′, then there exists some e′′ such that e is equivalent
to the whole consisting of e′ and e′′, the betterness relation could be
represented by a real-valued function which is additive with respect
to concatenation.15 Suppose that e is superior to e′ and Independence
holds. Superiority violates the Archimedean Condition – superiority is
precisely defined as the condition that there is no number such that ne′
is at least as good as e. Consequently, the value ratio between e and e′
is infinite and cannot be measured by any real number.16
Consider next weak superiority. In his discussion of measurement
of well-being, Griffin says about weak superiority (which he calls
‘discontinuity’) that it brings with it17
the suspension of addition; [. . .] we have a positive value that, no matter how
often a certain amount is added to itself, cannot become greater than another
positive value, and cannot, not because with piling up we get diminishing value
or even disvalue (though there are such cases), but because [it is] the sort of
value, that, even when remaining constant, cannot add up to some other value.
It is not part of the definition of weak superiority that value is
additive. However, Griffin seems here to assume that it is. Weak
superiority likewise violates the Archimedean Condition. However,
weak superiority is further assumed to imply that the inferior value
can add up to some amount of the weakly superior value. It is only when
the amount of the weakly superior value is sufficiently large (‘enough’)
that the inferior value cannot add up to this amount – addition is then
‘suspended’. I shall demonstrate that this picture cannot be upheld. If
e′ cannot add up tome, it cannot even add up to e. In other words, if we
assume Independence, then weak superiority collapses into superiority:
Observation 1: Independence implies that if some element e is weakly
superior to another e′, then e is also superior to e′.
Proof: Assume, for reductio, that some element e is weakly superior
to another element e′, but not superior to it. The fact that e is weakly
superior to e′ means that there is some m, such that me is better than
any number of e′-elements. The fact that e is not superior to e′ means
that there is some q, such that e is not better than qe′. Assume, for
all n=2, 3, . . . , that (n−1)e is not better than (n−1)qe′. Independence
15 Krantz et al., Foundations of Measurement, vol. 1, p. 74 (Theorem 1).
16 Cf. Krantz et al., Foundations of Measurement, vol. 1, pp. 271–2.
17 Griffin, Well-Being, p. 85.
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then implies that ne is not better than (n−1)qe′ concatenated with
e. Since e is not better than qe, Independence implies that (n−1)qe′
concatenated with e is not better than nqe′. Bymathematical induction,
it then follows that ne is not better than nqe′. But then it cannot be the
case that that there is somem, such thatme is better than any number
of e′-elements.
We know of course that if some element e is weakly superior to another
element e′, then there is one object, namely me, that is superior to e′.
However, Observation 1 implies also that e is superior to e′. This holds
regardless of the value of e and regardless of the size of m. In other
words, if we choose e to represent as small unit of value as we like, and
let as large a numberm of these units as we like be superior to any num-
ber of a slightly smaller unit e′, the consequence, given Independence,
will still be that just one unit of e will be better than any number of e′.
Arrhenius and Rabinowicz prove that, if in a decreasing sequence
e1, . . . , en the first element is superior to the last one, then Independence
implies that some element in the sequence is superior to its immediate
successor.18 So in this case we cannot come from the superior object to
the inferior object through a number of steps where each object in the
sequence is only marginally worse than its immediate predecessor. At
least one step is itself a step to something drastically worse – as a mat-
ter of fact, we know from above that it is a step to something infinitely
worse, since the difference cannot be measured by any real number.
SUPERIORITY IN VALUE WHEN VALUE IS NON-ADDITIVE
However, suppose we give up additivity, i.e. give up Independence. For
this case, Arrhenius and Rabinowicz prove: for any two objects e and
e′, where e is weakly superior to e′ without being superior to it, the
domain must contain a finite decreasing sequence of objects in which
the first element is superior to the last one, but no element is superior
to its immediate successor.19
We know from Observation 1 that the requirement that weak
superiority does not collapse into superiority is inconsistent with
Independence. And as Arrhenius and Rabinowicz note, if Independence
is denied, then it becomes possible that by concatenating some object e′
to itself any number of times, the marginal value of each contribution,
though always positive, converges to zero, such that there is a finite
upper limit to the aggregated value. I should like to demonstrate that
this will necessarily be the case.
18 Arrhenius and Rabinowicz, ‘Millian Superiorities’, p. 134 (Observation 2). The proof
is in Appendix 1, p. 138.
19 Arrhenius and Rabinowicz, ‘Millian Superiorities’, pp. 131–2 (Observation 1).
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Remember that we are dealing with a transitive and complete weak
betterness relation defined on a countable set of objects on which a
concatenation operation is defined, such that the domain is closed under
concatenation. Since the domain is a countable set, the betterness
relation can be represented ordinally by a real-valued function V, such
that
e is at least as good as e′ if and only if V(e)≥V(e′).20
Now the following can be proved:
Observation 2: Suppose it is the case that some object e is weakly
superior to another e′ without being superior to it. Then the sequence
V(e′), V(2e′), V(3e′), . . . has an upper bound.
Proof: Since e is weakly superior to e′, there is some m, such
that V(me) is greater than V(ne′), no matter how big n is. Assume,
for reductio, that the sequence V(e′), V(2e′), V(3e′), . . . has no upper
bound. We know that the sequence V(e′), V(2e′), V(3e′), . . . is increasing,
because we have assumed that ‘self-concatenation’ is value-increasing.
But any unbounded increasing infinite value sequence approaches
infinity. Then there must be some n, such that V(ne′) is greater than
the finite value V(me), which contradicts that e is weakly superior to e′.
Hence, weak superiority is not a sign of a large difference between the
superior and the inferior object, but rather dependent on how the value
of self-concatenation of the inferior object develops.We also know21 that
if some object e in a decreasing sequence is weakly superior to another
e′ without being superior to it, then the domain also contains some
object that is superior to e′. In fact, any object with a value above the
upper bound of the V(e′), V(2e′), V(3e′), . . . will be superior to e′. Thus,
under these circumstances, not even superiority is a sign of a radical
difference.
It could even be the case that some object e is superior to e′, but not
to some object e′′, which is worse than e′, because the aggregated value
of self-concatenation of e′′ has a higher upper bound than that of e′ or
even no upper bound and hence an aggregated value that could exceed
the value of e. Note also that if self-concatenation of e′′ has a higher
upper bound than that of e′, then we have a case where e′′ is weakly
superior to e′ even though e′′ is worse than e′.
Arrhenius and Rabinowicz also prove that if in a finite sequence
of objects the first element is weakly superior to the last element,
then there exists at least one element that is weakly superior to its
20 Cf. Krantz et al., Foundations of Measurement, vol. 1, p. 39 (Theorem 2.1).
21 From Arrhenius and Rabinowicz, ‘Millian Superiorities’, p. 131 (Observation 1).
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immediate successor.22 Given my observations above, there is a simple
and informative proof of this observation:
Proof: Suppose Independence is fulfilled. Because of my Observation
1, weak superiority collapses into superiority and we know23 that
in a decreasing sequence where the first element is superior (and
therefore also weakly superior) to the last element, then some element
in sequence is superior (and therefore also weakly superior) to its
immediate successor. And if Independence is not fulfilled, we know from
my Observation 2 that the last element, concatenated by an element
like itself any number of times, has an upper bound. The preceding
element, concatenated any number of times by an element like itself,
either has an upper bound which is higher than this or has no upper
bound, in which case it is weakly superior to the last element (because
there will be some number of this element which is better than any
number of the last) and the proof is done, or it has an upper bound that
is lower or equal to the bound of the last element, in which case it is
not weakly superior to it (indeed, if the upper bound is lower the last
element would be weakly superior to the preceding one). In the latter
case, we can repeat the procedure until we are either done or finally
reach the next-to-the-first element, which in that case must have an
upper bound that is lower than or equal to the bound of the last element;
but since the first element by hypothesis is weakly superior to the last
one, it is also weakly superior to this one.
Arrhenius and Rabinowicz are somewhat surprised by their result,
because they start out with the intuition that both superiority and
weak superiority are drastic differences in value. Whereas Rabinowicz
is willing to accept that an element can be weakly superior to another
even though it is only marginally better, Arrhenius24 sticks to the
intuition and takes the line that Rabinowicz’s and his results provide
an argument against superiority and weak superiority in all contexts
where it is possible to construct a sequence of objects in which the value
differences between adjacent objects are marginal.
But as my results show, weak superiority does not depend on the
difference between elements, but solely on how the aggregated value of
self-concatenation develops. Hence, even in a decreasing finite sequence
in which each consecutive element is only marginally worse than the
immediately preceding one, weak superiority can obtain; and even an
element which is worse than another might be weakly superior to it.
For the same reason, weak superiority between the extrema of a finite
22 Arrhenius and Rabinowicz, ‘Millian Superiorities’, pp. 136–7 (Observation 3).
23 From Arrhenius and Rabinowicz, ‘Millian Superiorities’, p. 134 (Observation 2).
24 See here also Gustaf Arrhenius, ‘Superiority in Value’, Philosophical Studies 123
(2005), pp. 97–114.
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sequence does not mean that the last element is radically worse than
the point of departure.Moreover, if we have a finite decreasing sequence
of objects in which the first element is superior to the last one, and
some element in the sequence is weakly superior to another one, then
not even superiority is a radical difference in value.
Arrhenius further claims that superiority andweak superiority share
some problems when we consider outcomes that involve both superior
and inferior objects.25 Consider three objects e, e′ and e′′, where e is
only marginally better than e′, and e′ is clearly better than e′′. Assume
further that e is superior or weakly superior to e′ (and in the latter
case, let n be a number such that ne is better than any number e′).
Compare a whole, a, consisting of ne, with another whole, b, consisting
of ne and me′′, where m is much greater than n. By the assumption of
value increasingness, b is better than a. Consider now a third whole, c,
consisting of (n+m)e′. Since e (or ne) is superior to e′, a is better than
c. However, Arrhenius says, compare b and c: since the loss of getting
e′ instead of e is only marginal, and the gain from getting e′ instead of
e′′ is bigger, there should be some sufficiently large m, such that c is
better than b; and then, by transitivity, we would have that c is better
than a. Hence, the notions of superiority and weak superiority seem to
imply a contradiction in this case.
But, taken at face value, Arrhenius’s reasoning is mistaken. If e is
superior (orweakly superior) to e′, then the loss of e (or the loss of having
less than ne) cannot be compensated by any number of e′. Therefore, b
is better than c, and there is no contradiction. When he says that there
is marginal loss for each e-object that has been exchanged for an e′-
object, but a bigger gain for each e′′-object that has been exchanged for
an e′-object, he appears to assume Independence. But if Independence
is fulfilled, and e is superior to e′, the value difference between e and e′
cannot be marginal, which it is by hypothesis in the example.
However, Arrhenius might still have a point. When he says that it
is hard to deny that there is some m such that the smaller number
of smaller losses is compensated for by the greater number of greater
gains, he could be understood as implying that, given the marginal
difference between e and e′, it is implausible that the loss of ne (or
even e) cannot be compensated by a sufficiently large number m of e′-
objects; otherwise, themarginal value of adding extra e′-objects would –
implausibly – diminish extremely rapidly. This may be true, in which
case c would be better than b (which is better than a); but if it is, e
cannot be superior or weakly superior to e′, and so a cannot at the same
time be better than c. Thus, even though there is no contradiction, this
25 Arrhenius, ‘Superiority in Value’, pp. 108–9.
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reasoning could support his initial claim that superiority relations are
implausible in these contexts.
AN EXAMPLE OF LARRY TEMKIN’S
It is illuminating to apply these results on an example of Larry
Temkin’s.26 Temkin asks us to consider the following claims:27
Claim 1: for any unpleasant or ‘negative’ experience, no matter what
the intensity and duration of that experience, it would be
better to have that experience than one that was only a little
less intense but twice as long.
Claim 2: there is a continuum of unpleasant or ‘negative’ experiences
ranging in intensity, for example, from extreme forms of
torture to the mild discomfort of a hangnail.
Claim 3: a mild discomfort for the duration of one’s life would be
preferable to two years of excruciating torture, no matter the
length of one’s life.
Temkin then argues that, taken together, these claims constitute a
serious threat to the transitivity of the betterness relation.
Suppose we have a sequence of negative experiences for the
duration of one year, a, b, . . . , y, of descending intensity ranging
from excruciating torture to the discomfort of a hangnail. Suppose
further that negative experiences can be concatenated with each other,
including the possibility of self-concatenating, and that concatenation
is negatively value increasing. Then consider the sequence 2a (two
years of excruciating torture), 4b (four years of slightly less intense
torture), . . . , 2ny (the discomfort of a hangnail for very many years). It
follows from the Claim 1 that 2a is better than 4b, 4b is better than
8c and so on down to 2(n−1)x is better than 2ny. Transitivity then
implies that 2a is better than 2ny, but Claim 3 says that 2ny is better
than 2a, thus violating transitivity.
In his defence of Claim 3, Temkin appears to refer to some kind
superiority relation:28
It is commonly observed that many people suffering a slight headache does not
add up to a single person suffering a migraine. This observation reflects an
important fact. [. . .] pains and pleasures are not like pennies and grams. They
simply do not add up in the way they would have to for us to reject claim 3.
26 Larry S. Temkin, ‘A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity’, Philosophy & Public
Affairs 25–3 (1996), 174–210.
27 Temkin, ‘A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity’, p. 179.
28 Temkin, ‘A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity’, p. 190.
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More precisely, he appears to apply a version of weak superiority:29
But, in essence, I think significant amounts of torture have lexical priority
over any amount of a hangnail, [. . .]. My model for this is something like
the following. Torture’s badness might range from 0 to 10, depending on its
duration, with two years of torture being, say, a 7. A hangnail’s badness might
range from 0 to 1. Prolonging a hangnail increases the value of the decimal
places representing its ‘badness score,’ but the fundamental gap between 1 and
7 is never affected.
It will be convenient to assume the existence of a worseness relation, –
is at least as bad as –, defined on the domain of negative experiences
by e is at least as bad as e′ if and only if e′ is as least as good as e. Let
superiority and weak superiority relations be defined for worseness:
an object e is superior in worseness to an object e′ if and only if, for
all positive integers n, e is worse than ne′; and an object e is weakly
superior in worseness to an object e′ if and only if, for some positive
integer m and all positive integers n, me is worse than ne′.
Suppose, first, that the value of pain is additive in the sense that it is
measured by adding up the intensity for each year. Then Independence
is fulfilled. Since the intensity in Temkin’s example is the same
throughout the duration of the negative experience, the value is simply
measured by the intensity multiplied by the duration.
We know from Observation 1 that if some duration of torture with
intensity a is worse than any duration of a hangnail with intensity y,
then any duration of torture with intensity a, however short, is worse
than any duration of a hangnail with intensity y. And we know30 that
some experience in the sequence is superior in worseness to its imme-
diate successor. Then claim 1 is false, since the successor at this place
in the sequence cannot add up to its predecessor; and also claim 2 will
be false, since there will be discontinuity in the sequence at this place.
In case there is just one such discontinuity in the sequence, say at the
ith step between p and q, and claim 1 holds for adjacent pairs above and
below this step, the picture we get is one sequence where 2a is better
than 4b, 4b is better than 8c, and so on down to 2ip; on a second order
of magnitude below this sequence, there is another sequence where
2(i+1)q is better than 2(i+2)r and so on down to 2ny. Hence, perhaps
surprisingly, the best object is 2(i+1)q and the worst is 2ip, but there
is no intransitivity.
Suppose next that that Independence does not hold. We then know
from Observation 2 that if torture with intensity a is superior in
worseness to any duration of a hangnail with intensity y without
29 Temkin, ‘A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity’, p. 191.
30 From Arrhenius and Rabinowicz, ‘Millian Superiorities’, p. 134 (Observation 2).
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being superior in worseness to it, then the badness of the discomfort
from a hangnail for a year, concatenated with itself over time, has an
upper limit. We also know31 that there exists at least one experience
in the sequence that is weakly superior in worseness to its immediate
successor.
In this case, claim 2 is true. However, supposing that there is just one
case of weak superiority in worseness between adjacent experiences in
the sequence, say at the ith step between p and q, claim 1 is false for
this step, because some duration of p will be worse than any duration
of q. In fact, it can be shown that 2ip is worse than any duration
q. It is assumed that 2a is worse than any duration of y. Since it is
also assumed that none of the first i experiences is weakly superior to
its successor, we also assume that 2a is better than 4b, 4b is better
than 8c, and so on down to 2ip, and hence, that 2ip is worse than any
duration of y. It is clear from my proof of Arrhenius’s and Rabinowicz’s
Observation 3 that in the sequence from x up to q, the badness of each
experience, concatenated with itself over time, will have an upper limit
which is not worse than the limit of its predecessor. We might therefore
conclude that any duration of q has an upper limit, which is not worse
than 2ip. Hence, we get the picture that 2(i+1)q is better than 2a,
2a is better than 4b, 4b is better than 8c, and so on down to 2ip. The
experiences 2(i+1)q, 2(i+2)r, . . . , 2ny are all better than 2a; however,
the example is not sufficiently detailed to determine their pairwise
ranking as regards worseness. For low durations, an experience in the
sequence might be better than its successor, but for long durations
where the badness approaches its upper limit, the successor might be
worse than the predecessor. One way or the other, however, there is no
reason to suspect intransitivity.
The common point is that, in order for claim 1 to be generally true,
pain has to be aggregated additively with respect to time in a way
that fulfils the Archimedean Condition. However, in his defence of
claim 3, Temkin denies that pain is aggregated in this way, because
otherwise claim 3 would be false. Temkin might of course object that
my reasoning presupposes transitivity. But in order to represent a case
against transitivity, each of the three claims should be plausible in
its own right. If Temkin implicitly appeals to two conflicting notions
of aggregation, we have good reason to doubt that the three claims
are simultaneously true. I shall not here attempt to decide which
form of aggregation is correct. However, I should like to mention that
if aggregation of the disvalue of pain over time implies diminishing
marginal disvalue, this does not necessarily transfer to interpersonal
31 From Arrhenius and Rabinowicz, ‘Millian Superiorities’, p. 136 (Observation 3).
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aggregation of the disvalue of pain, as Temkin hints at in the first
quotation above. The idea that intrapersonal aggregation transfers
to interpersonal aggregation is at the heart of Griffin’s suggestion, to
which I turn next.
SUPERIORITY IN VALUE AND THE REPUGNANT
CONCLUSION IN A CONTEXT WHERE VALUE IS ADDITIVE
Griffin’s main idea is that no amount of certain less important values
can ever compensate a substantial loss of certain more important and
genuine values. The underlying picture here is that welfare depends
on the degree to which a number of prudential values are realized.32
More precisely, I shall assume that welfare is measured by the sum
of the value contribution from each value. And if one of the important
values is realized to a sufficient degree, its value contribution is such
that the contribution from an unimportant value never can add up to
it, no matter how much it is realized.
Griffin gives an example, in which an unimportant value is a sort of
residual value to an important one, such that when the latter is lost, we
might get the former:33 the important value is ‘appreciation of beauty’.
If we gradually reduce the degree to which this value is realized, we
shall eventually reach a point at which it is lost. We might instead
have ‘kicks of kitsch’, but they are different, that is, they represent a
different value, which still gives a positive contribution but one that is
inferior to the contribution from genuine appreciation of beauty.
Griffin’s suggestion is based on the idea that weak superiority
between valuable objects is a more plausible condition than superiority.
But since his suggestion also implies a context where value is additive,
we should expect from Observation 1 that weak superiority collapses
into superiority. However, to be able to apply Observation 1 in this
context, I need to set up a slightly more complicated apparatus.
I assume a list of prudential values A, B, C, . . . . In a given life, each
of these values is realized to a certain degree which I shall assume
can be measured by a non-negative number. Thus, there is a domain
of possible lives, L= {l1, l2, l3, . . . }, where each life is represented by a
vector (a, b, c, . . .) and a, b, c, . . . are non-negative numbers describing
the degree to which each of the values A, B, C, . . . is realized in this life.
As before, there is aweak betterness relation, – is at least as good as –,
defined on this domain, which is assumed to be transitive and complete.
This relation embodies global preferences over the domain of possible
lives, which Griffin considers basic for the measurement of welfare.
32 Cf. the list in Griffin, Well-Being, p. 67.
33 Griffin, Well-Being, pp. 86–7.
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Some valuesmight really be disvalues, giving a negative contribution
to overall welfare. In this context, I shall only consider values giving
positive or zero contribution to overall welfare. However, I shall allow
for the fact that the marginal contribution from each positive value
diminishes the more it is realized.
Next, I shall assume some necessary conditions for value
contributions to be additive, such that the welfare of a life, w(l)
where l= (a, b, c, . . .), could be measured by the sum of contributions
wA(a)+wB(b)+wC(c)+ . . . from each of the values. Here, I draw on
what is known as additive conjoint measurement.34 Additive conjoint
measurement does not rely on a simple concatenation procedure like
the one outlined above, with respect to which it is additive. In order to
establish additivity, it simulates concatenation in a more complicated
way.35 The first necessary condition is a form of independence known
as strong separability:
Definition 3: Consider some subset of values, say P andQ, and let the
degree of realization of each of the remaining values be kept constant
(a, b, . . . , o, r, s, . . .). The betterness relation will rank alternative
combinations (p, q) of the degree to which P and Q are realized, given
this fixed choice of the degree of realization of the remaining values.
If this ranking is the same for all possible fixed choices, the subset of
values P and Q are said to be separable in the betterness relation. If
any arbitrary subset of values is separable in this way, the betterness
relation is said to be strongly separable.
If the betterness relation is strongly separable, it induces a transitive
and complete betterness relation on each subset of values. In other
words, we can then evaluate the betterness of each subset of values
independently from the other values.
The other necessary condition I shall introduce is the existence of
standard sequences for each value. A standard sequence defines value
differences having non-zero, equal spacing in the intended numerical
representation of the value contribution from each value. Consider
again the values P and Q. Arbitrarily, define some unit q1 on Q. Now,
find some degree p1, such that (p1, 0) = (0, q1).36 (Note that this only
works if P and Q are both important or both unimportant. Hence, I
34 Cf. Krantz et al., Foundations of Measurement, vol. 1, pp. 245–315 (ch. 6).
35 In the standard framework, it is assumed that the set of possible lives,L, is a product
set. This means that the values in a life are independently realizable, i.e. that that the
domain contains every possible combination of degrees of realization of values. However,
this is not a condition which is necessary for the additive representation as such.
36 To be sure this can be done, we need to assume a solvability condition, cf. Krantz
et al., Foundations of Measurement, vol. 1, p. 301. This is another structural condition,
which is not necessary for the additive representation.
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shall assume that there are at least two values on each level.) Then,
find some degree p2, such that (p2, 0) is equivalent with (p1, q1). Go on
and find some degree p3, such that (p3, 0) is equivalent with (p2, q1).
Similarly, define p4, p5, . . . . Now, we have defined a standard sequence
on value P:
Definition 4: A sequence of degrees pi, pi + 1, . . . , i=1, 2, . . . , of some
value P is a standard sequence if and only if there exists q1, q2 on some
other value Q such that q1 is better than q2 and for all i = 1, 2, . . . , (pi,
q1) is equally as good as (pi + 1, q2). A standard sequence can be either
finite or infinite.
A similar procedure can be used on Q. And we can go on adding
definitions of fractions of the chosen unit.
The plausibility of these conditions depends of course a lot onwhether
it is possible to describe and individuate values in a way such that
the contribution of any subset of values, as derived from our basic
preferences over possible lives, is independent of the degree to which
other values are realized. I shall not here attempt to argue that these
conditions are in fact fulfilled. The point is merely to point out that
these conditions are necessary for the argument Griffin wants to make,
and to spell out the consequences.
The standard sequence p1, p2, p3, . . . can be understood as additive
self-concatenation of p1, where p2 is a whole consisting of p1
concatenated with an object like itself, and where also q1 is defined
as an object like p1. And given strong separability and a standard
sequence p1, p2, p3, . . .defined on P using q1, q2, q3, . . . on Q, it
follows straightforwardly from the definition of standard sequences
that Independence will be fulfilled for this standard sequence on P,
such that, for all non-negative integers n, n′ and m where n≥n′, pn is
at least as good as pn′ if and only if pn + m is at least as good as pn′ + m.37
Suppose now, as Griffin suggests, that A is weakly superior to B in
the sense that, for any standard sequences a1, a2, a3, . . . and b1, b2,
b3, . . . ,38 there is some m such that (am, 0) is better than (0, bn), no
matter how big n is. In the context of additive conjoint measurement,
the Archimedean condition can be stated thus: every strictly bounded
standard sequence is finite.39 But as weak superiority is defined here,
it violates the Archimedean condition, because the standard sequence
b1, b2, b3, . . . is infinite and still strictly bounded by (am, 0). Hence, the
37 In other words, if a numerical representation were possible (which I have not yet
assumed), we would have wP(p2)=2wP(p1), wP(p3)=3 wP(p1), . . . .
38 Note that these standard sequences are not defined relative to each other.
39 Cf. Krantz et al., Foundations of Measurement, vol. 1, p. 253.
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difference between am and b1 is infinitely large and cannot bemeasured
by any real number. This is precisely what Griffin needs.
However, we are now in a position where we can apply Observation 1
and demonstrate that weak superiority collapses into superiority: if
(am, 0) is better than (0, bn), no matter how big n is, then it follows from
Observation 1 that (a1, 0) is better than (0, bn), no matter how big n
is. In other words, even the smallest degree to which A can be realized
will be better than B, no matter the degree to which it is realized.
Consequently, contrary to his inclination, if Griffin wants to keep the
idea that some levels of welfare do not add up to others, he is bound to
base his argument on superiority rather than on weak superiority.
Even so, we might still have a credible view which might avoid the
Repugnant Conclusion. I shall make some of its implications clear.
Consider a sequence of lives with decreasing of levels of welfare a,
b, c . . . , z. Given that we accept the Utilitarian Total Principle, a
concatenation procedure is defined, the betterness relation is given
and the Independence condition is satisfied. Griffin suggests that some
number of people n at some level, saym, is weakly superior to the level
z. But then it follows from Observation 1, first, that m is superior to z;
in other words, it would be the case that even one person atm outranks
any number of lives at z.
Furthermore, we know40 that if we have a decreasing sequence m,
n, . . . , z where m is superior to z, then there will be some level in
the sequence which is superior to its immediate successor. In other
words, one person living at the lowest level before the discontinuity
sets in is superior to any number of people living at z. Call this level
y. Suppose there is some n such that ny is equally good as m. Then
the same consequence would follow from my Observation 1: since y is
weakly superior to z (becausem and therefore also ny is superior to z),
it follows that y is superior to z.
Strictly speaking, this view does not avoid the Repugnant Conclusion
as I have stated it. I shall assume that welfare is measurable on a
scale that has an extension of the real numbers with infinitesimal
numbers.41 I shall not go into technical details about infinitesimal
numbers.42 It suffices with the intuitive understanding that adding
an infinitesimal number to another infinitesimal number results in
40 From Arrhenius and Rabinowicz, ‘Millian Superiorities’, p. 134 (Observation 2).
41 Alternatively, we could imagine that welfare is measured on two dimensions, cf. M.
Hausner: ‘Multidimensional Utilities’,Decision Processes, ed. R. M. Thrall, C. H. Coombs
and R. L. Davis (New York, 1954), pp. 167–80.
42 There is a rigorous treatment in Abraham Robinson, Non-Standard Analysis,
rev. edn. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1974). As for measurement, see Louis Narens,
‘Measurement without Archimedean Axioms’, Philosophy of Science 41 (1974),
pp. 374–93; Louis Narens, ‘Minimal Conditions for Additive Conjoint Measurement and
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an infinitesimal number, and consequently, that multiplication of an
infinitesimal number with an integer results in another infinitesimal
number. On this scale, it is still the case that, for any positive finite
level of welfare, y, however close to zero, a population of m people at
y is better than n people at a, provided my>na. It is just that below
such level y, however low, there are lives definitely worse than y but
still worth living – these are the onesmeasured by infinitesimally small
levels. So maybe the level y is not so bad after all.43
Whether this is a credible view depends on how the zero on the
scale is determined,44 and where the discontinuity sets in. Like Parfit,
Griffin appears to have a zero for the scale of welfare in mind, which
is something like the level where there is no point of living the life, a
life with neither positive nor negative value at all;45 and implicitly, this
zero is also the level on which the existence of the person is indifferent
from the point of view of the Total Principle.46
As regards the discontinuity, we saw above that even the smallest
degree to which some superior value A can be realized will be better
than some inferior value B, no matter the degree to which it is realized.
This means that a life in which just one superior value is realized to
the smallest possible degree is infinitely better that a life in which no
superior values are realized. Interestingly, Griffin seems to accept this
consequence, when he says:47
Then we might wish to stop the slide [. . .] at that point along the line where
people’s capacity to appreciate beauty, to form deep loving relationships,
to accomplish something with their lives beyond just staying alive . . .all
disappear.
Given thismore explicit statement, we can now evaluate the repugnant-
like conclusion: for any positive finite (i.e. non-infinitesimal) level of
welfare, y, however low, a population of m people at y is better than
n people at a, provided my>na. It means that a sufficiently large
number of persons with lives just barely realizing one important value
in life will represent a greater total and therefore be better than some
number of persons with a very high welfare. This still seems to me a
rather repugnant conclusion.
Qualitative Probability’, Journal of Mathematical Psychology 11 (1974), pp. 404–30; and
Heinz J. Skala, Non-Archimedean Utility Theory (Dordrecht, 1975).
43 I owe this interpretation to a communication from John Broome.
44 Cf. John Broome, Weighing Lives (Oxford, 2004), p. 138. This point is largely
overlooked.
45 Griffin, Well-Being, pp. 130–1, 345 (n. 12).
46 Conceptually, however, these are two different questions. Cf. Broome, Weighing
Lives, pp. pp. 199–214 (ch. 14).
47 Griffin, Well-Being, p. 340 (n. 27), my italics.
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Another troublesome implication stems from the fact that even one
person living at a finite level as close to zero as we want is better
than any number of people living at a positive infinitesimal level. It
means that the view implies a version of what Parfit calls the Absurd
Conclusion: it is better that there live no people at all than a number of
people with infinitesimally low welfare and one person in suffering at
any finite negative level. Like Parfit, many would find this implication
absurd.
SUPERIORITY IN VALUE AND THE REPUGNANT
CONCLUSION IN A CONTEXT WHERE VALUE IS
NON-ADDITIVE
Suppose next that we give up the conditions necessary for additivity, i.e.
strong separability and the existence of standard sequences. There is a
transitive and complete weak betterness relation defined on the domain
of possible lives, L= {l1, l2, l3, . . . }, where each life is represented by a
vector (a, b, c, . . .) and a, b, c, . . . are non-negative numbers describing
the degree to which each of the values A, B, C, . . . is realized in this life.
Assume that weak betterness fulfils strong monotonicity such that, for
all pairs of lives, if one life has all values realized to at least the same
degree as another, and at least one value is realized to higher degree,
then it is better.
If in this framework A is weakly superior to B, it means that there is
some a such that if A drops below a, no degree of B can ever compensate
this loss in value (other values kept constant). However, this is
compatible with the superior and the inferior life being measurable
on the same real-valued scale. If we were to apply the Utilitarian Total
Principle,48 it is clear that n people on the superior level always can
be outweighed by a sufficiently large number m on the inferior level.
Hence, in this case, the Repugnant Conclusion could not be avoided.
However, even though Griffin’s suggestion appears to be based
on the idea that values are additive, he is in fact rather sceptical
about measuring welfare on a cardinal scale.49 Thus, it is possible to
understand how weak superiority between prudential values would
get transferred to interpersonal calculation in another way. Just as the
comparison of lives is a matter of basic preferences, not of calculations
based on other sources, comparisons of populations will have to be
48 However, in this case, the framework described so far does not provide a cardinal
scale that would allow summing up welfare.
49 Cf. Griffin, Well-Being, pp. 88, 98–102.
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a matter of basic rankings.50 If this is the case, there is no route to
determining the most beneficent outcome through simple summation.
Then Griffin’s suggestion, ‘Perhaps it is better to have a certain number
of people at a certain high level than a very much larger number at a
level where life is just worth living’, could be interpreted as such a basic
ranking where the weak superiority does not collapse.
Consider a sequence of lives with decreasing of levels of welfare a,
b, c . . . , z. I assume that there is a concatenation procedure, such that
we can concatenate lives into wholes (that is, populations) and that
the domain is closed under concatenation. I also assume that a weak
betterness relation, which is transitive and complete, is defined on the
domain. In this framework, the ranking can be stated as: there is some
level p, which is weakly superior to z, without being superior to it. This
means that there is some number m such that, for all positive integers
n, mp is better than nz.
We know from section 1 that the betterness relation on this domain
can be represented ordinally by a real-valued function, V. And we know
from Observation 2 that if p is weakly superior to z without being
superior to it, then the increasing sequence V(z), V(2z), V(3z), . . . has
an upper bound.
Thus, the basic ranking in this context implies that adding more
people at z has diminishing marginal value that converges to zero. It
makes the value of a person at z depend on how many other people
there are at this level. And this is implausible. I can think of no reason
having to do with beneficence why one out of two persons at the same
level of welfare should have more weight than the other. This is my
main objection to this view.
Arrhenius states another objection,51 namely that this view either
implies the Mere Addition Paradox52 or else it violates what he calls
The Inequality Aversion Condition: for any triplet of welfare levels a,
y, z and for any population na, there is some number m, such that the
perfectly equal population (m+n)y is at least as good as the population
combined of na and mz. The combined population na and mz is better
than the population na. If we assume that the view complies with The
Inequality Aversion Condition, the equal population (n+m)y will be at
least as good as the population combined of na andmz. By transitivity,
the equal population (m+n)y is then at least as good as na. But the
view is supposed to imply that na is better than (m+n)y in the cases
50 This is how Gustaf Arrhenius: Future Generations. A Challenge for Moral Theory
(Uppsala, 2000), pp. 96–7, understands Griffin. The interpretation is also apparent in
Roger Crisp, ‘Utilitarianism and the Life of Virtue’, The Philosophical Quarterly 42
(1992), pp. 139–60.
51 Arrhenius, ‘Future Generations’, pp. 97–100.
52 Cf. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 419–42 (ch. 19).
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where a is weakly superior to y. Hence, the view cannot comply with
The Inequality Aversion Condition.
The Inequality Aversion Condition is widely assumed to be very
plausible.53 However, if one shares the basic ranking that a certain
number of people, n, at a certain high level, a, is better than a very
much larger number (n + m) at a level y where life is just worth living,
itmight not be unreasonable to denyThe Inequality AversionCondition.
It should be accepted that a population combined of na andmz, where z
is slightly worse than y, is better than na alone. But it might be claimed
that, in spite of the equality obtained by the move from na combined
with mz to (n+m)y, no number of people gaining slightly more than
z can compensate the great loss of the n people. Therefore, I am not
inclined to attach great weight to Arrhenius’s objection.
A DIFFERENT SUGGESTION
Let me briefly mention a suggestion, which I believe Jonathan Glover
was the first to make:54
But the concession that, other things being equal, there is value in extra happy
people need not commit us to a simple policy of maximizing happiness. [. . .]
It is open to us to say that one thing we value is total happiness [. . .] without
simply adopting the total view. For we may decide that we value people’s lives
having various qualities (which would put them high on the scale of ‘worth-
while life′) and that the absence of these qualities cannot be compensated for
by any numbers of extra worth-while lives without them. [. . .]
So we can think that extra people with lives worth living are in themselves a
good thing, without having to allow that there is always some number of people
whose existence outweighs any particular impoverishment of life.
Parfit has made a similar suggestion.55
Consider what I shall call the best things in life. These are the best kinds of cre-
ative activity and aesthetic experience, the best relationships between different
people, and the other things which do most to make life worth living [. . .]
Why is it so hard to believe that my imagined world Z [. . .] would be better
than a world of ten billion people, all of whom have an extremely high quality
of life? This is hard to believe because in Z two things are true: people’s lives
are barely worth living, and most of the good things in life are lost. [. . .]
What we might appeal to is [. . .] Perfectionism. [. . .] We might claim that,
even if some change brings a great net benefit to those who are affected, it is a
change for the worse if it involves the loss of one of the best things in life.
53 In fact, it is a weak statement of the requirement I mentioned in n. 3.
54 Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth, 1977),
pp. 70–1.
55 Derek Parfit, ‘Overpopulation and the Quality of Life’, Applied Ethics, ed. P. Singer
(Oxford, 1986), pp. 161–3.
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The idea seems to be that, apart from the total of welfare, there is
a separate consideration (Parfit calls it Perfectionism) concerning the
various qualities in people’s lives. And there is a superiority relation
between them, such that a sufficiently high level of these qualities
cannot be compensated by the existence of extra people without these
qualities, whatever their number.
Whereas in the previous section the evaluation was based on a
basic ranking of outcomes, it is here based on two considerations that
have to be weighed up against each other. Since the total of welfare
approaches infinity when the number of people increases, the level of
sufficiently high quality will have to be infinitely better than the level
of insufficiently high quality just below. Such a dramatic discontinuity
might not be plausible. Apart from that, this view will have the same
implication as the Lexical View which I mentioned in the Introduction:
it will put less weight on people at a low level, and this might be hard
to justify.
CONCLUSION
I have demonstrated that weak superiority behaves very differently,
depending on whether value is additive or not. In an additive context,
weak superiority collapses into superiority, which in this context is
a radical difference. In a non-additive context, the inferior value has
diminishing marginal value converging to zero, such that when the
value increases, it approaches a finite upper bound. In the latter
context, weak superiority is not a radical difference in value; and even
superiority is not a radical difference in value if it is in-between the
superior and the inferior object, some element is weakly superior to
another one.
Often, this difference is overlooked. For instance, Griffin appears on
the one hand to appeal to the larger plausibility of weak superiority
between values and at the same to hint at infinite value differences.
But it is not possible to have both. Also, I have demonstrated that in
moving to an additive context, rather strong additional assumptions
are needed. Finally, I have also demonstrated the consequences of
using weak superiority to block the Repugnant Conclusion in an
additive, a non-additive and a mixed context respectively. In the first
case (where weak superiority collapses), the Repugnant Conclusion is,
strictly speaking, not avoided. It is just that below any finite level,
there are lives definitely worse. In the second case, the implication is
that adding more people at low levels has diminishing marginal value
converging to zero. In the third case, there is a dramatic discontinuity
in the consideration concerning the various qualities of people’s lives.
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None of these implications is plausible. However, since it is hard to
come up with coherent theories in the field of population ethics, weak
superiority perhaps retains some interest.56
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